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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Clarke appeals from his judgment of conviction for three drug-related offenses. He
raised two issues on appeal. First, he challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress because his warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed outside the police officer’s
presence (a “completed misdemeanor”) violated the Idaho and United States Constitutions. Due
to the constitutional violations, the district court should have suppressed all evidence obtained
after his arrest. Second, Mr. Clarke argued the prosecutor committed misconduct in her closing
argument by misrepresenting the evidence to the jury. This prosecutorial misconduct clearly
violated Mr. Clarke’s unwaived constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial and was not
harmless.  This  Reply  Brief  responds  to  some,  but  not  all,  of  the  State’s  arguments.  For  those
arguments not addressed here, Mr. Clarke respectfully refers this Court to his Appellant’s Brief.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Clarke’s




I. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Clarke’s motion to suppress evidence obtained
following his warrantless arrest for an alleged misdemeanor committed outside the police
officer’s presence?
II. Did the State violate Mr. Clarke’s constitutional right to a fair trial when the prosecutor




The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Clarke’s Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained
Following His Warrantless Arrest For An Alleged Misdemeanor Committed Outside The Police
Officer’s Presence
Mr. Clarke challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress on two
separate legal grounds. First, he argued his warrantless arrest for a completed misdemeanor
violated the protections of Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (App Br., pp.7–16.)
Second, he contended his arrest was also in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against unreasonable seizures. (App. Br., pp.16–25.) Due to either the state or federal
constitutional violation, Mr. Clarke asserted the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress the evidence found after his warrantless arrest. (See generally App. Br., pp.7–25.)
Examining the Idaho Constitution first, Mr. Clarke disputes the State’s claim that the
prohibition on warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors is purely statutory. Green plainly
holds otherwise. In State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884 (2015), this Court examined Article I, Section
17 to determine whether an arrest “that does not comply with an Idaho statute governing arrest,1
is ‘lawful’ in the context of Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.” Id. at 887. This
Court held that it was. Id. at 887–92. This Court reasoned a statutory violation of the traffic law
did not amount to an Idaho constitutional violation. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Green
Court set forth the constitutional standards for an arrest in Idaho. Id. at 888. This Court stated:
Because the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizure of the person
includes an arrest, the Idaho Constitution incorporated the principles regarding
arrest in the Idaho statutory and common law in 1890 when the constitution was
adopted. At that time, the law governing warrantless arrests by peace officers in
1 The statute at issue, I.C. § 49-1407, provided that the police officer could only give the
defendant a citation for driving without a license, but the police officer arrested her instead.
Green, 158 Idaho at 887.
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Idaho was found in Title III, Chapter V, Section 7540 of the Idaho Revised
Statutes [(hereinafter, R.S. § 7540)], which provided:
A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant
delivered to him, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in
his presence. . . .
Id. The Green Court concluded, “Therefore, arrests made under the circumstances specified in
this statute should be accepted as constitutionally reasonable under the Idaho Constitution.” Id. It
follows that arrests not made under these circumstances are not constitutionally reasonable. In
fact, this Court reached this conclusion in Green as well. This Court held the subsequently
enacted sections of R.S. § 7540 were not “made through the same rigorous standard as an
amendment to the Idaho Constitution,” and thus “cannot be considered part of the constitutional
standard for what constitutes a reasonable seizure of the person.” Id. at 888–89. Only the sections
of R.S. § 7540 in effect at the time of the adoption of the Idaho Constitution establish the
parameters for constitutionally reasonable arrests. By the same token, arrests that do not comply
with R.S. § 7540 are constitutionally unreasonable.  Therefore,  contrary to the State’s assertion,
the Idaho Constitution incorporated R.S. § 7540 as the standard for reasonable and thus lawful
arrests.
The incorporation of certain statutory protections into Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution was repeatedly emphasized in Green (but apparently overlooked by the State on
appeal). (See Resp. Br., p.15.) In determining whether a statutory violation was subject to the
exclusionary rule, the Green Court distinguished between pure statutory violations and statutory
violations that were actually “violating rights guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution.” 158 Idaho
at 890. For example, the Court discussed a violation of statutory knock-and-announce rules,
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which required suppression because “the officers’ failure to knock and announce violated
principles incorporated into the Constitution at the time it was adopted. It is this direct violation
of  principles  inherent  in  the  Constitution  that  resulted  in  the  constitutional  remedy  of
suppression.” Id. Idaho’s knock-and-announce rules were “deeply rooted in our heritage” and
“codifying a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law.” Id. at 889 (quoting State v. Rauch, 99
Idaho 586, 593–94 (1978)). “Therefore, whether phrased as a statutory violation or a
constitutional violation, when the police . . . failed to knock and announce their presence, they
were violating more than simply a statutory requirement. They were violating rights guaranteed
by the Idaho Constitution.” Id. at 890 (emphasis added). The Court even analogized the knock-
and-announce rules to the very protections at issue here—“Like the warrantless arrest standards
in Idaho Code section 19-603(1)–(5), the requirement that police knock and announce their
presence was incorporated into the Idaho Constitution at the time it was adopted.” Id. (emphasis
added). As shown by this example, the Green Court could not have been more clear that the
Idaho Constitution incorporated certain statutory protections, including I.C. § 19-603(1)–(5)
(formerly codified at R.S. § 7540).
The Green Court went on to give another example of a statutory-turned-constitutional
violation—an unsigned search warrant, which again required suppression. The Court reasoned,
“[T]he principles found in the code sections requiring a warrant to be signed were part of Idaho
law prior to the adoption of the Idaho Constitution” and thus “create a substantive right,” which
existed “prior to the adoption of this State’s Constitution.” 158 Idaho at 890 (quoting State v.
Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 869 (1997)). Again referencing the Idaho Constitution’s incorporation
of certain statutory protections, the Court explained:
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[T]his rule is limited to statutory principles incorporated into Article I, Section 17
because they were present at the time of the Constitution’s adoption. It is,
therefore, not the violation of the statute that offends the Constitution; the offense
comes from violating principles incorporated into Article I, Section 17. The fact
that those principles also continue to be codified in the Idaho Code and there is
also  a  violation  of  that  code  does  not  mean the  violation  is  not  constitutional  in
nature. This limitation of the Mathews holding [requiring suppression of evidence
from an unsigned warrant] to violations of principles in effect at the time the
Constitution was adopted is consistent with the statutory violations discussed
above, such as knock-and-announce statutes and pre-existing arrest statutes.
Green, 158 Idaho at 890–91 (emphasis added). Once again, this Court referenced the “pre-
existing arrest statutes” as incorporated in the Idaho Constitution. This is yet another example of
this Court identifying the substantive protections in R.S. § 7540 (now I.C. § 19-603(1)–(5)) as
incorporated into Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
Accordingly, Mr. Clarke has not “flipped” Green on its head, as argued by the State.
(Resp. Br., p.15.) Mr. Clark is simply holding the State, and law enforcement, to its
constitutional limitations. Green explicitly held the Idaho Constitution adopted certain statutory
protections as constitutional ones. Violations of those constitutional protections require
suppression. 158 Idaho at 892. In Green, there was “no historical counterpart” to the traffic law
at issue “that was present at the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted.” Id. “Therefore, it
cannot be said that the principles in that section limiting certain warrantless misdemeanor arrests
to specific circumstances2 are constitutional in nature.” Id. Here, there is a “historical
counterpart” and “principles” that “are constitutional in nature.” The prohibition on warrantless
arrests for completed misdemeanors has “a historical, pre-constitution source of the currently
codified principles”—R.S. § 7540, which has been in effect since 1887. Green, 158 Idaho at 892.
2 Again,  the  statute  restricted  when  an  officer  could  arrest  an  individual  for  driving  without  a
license. I.C. § 49-1407.
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(App. Br., pp.11–12.) Accordingly, the remedy of “suppression” is “justified by a direct violation
of principles inherent in the Idaho Constitution.” Green, 158 Idaho at 892.
The State also seems to argue the legislature has the authority to alter the Idaho
Constitution by enacting a statute. (Resp. Br., pp.15–16.) Green (not to mention basic separation
of powers principles) explicitly rejected this proposition:
To hold otherwise would essentially allow the Legislature to amend the Idaho
Constitution by the process of a statutory enactment or amendment. Because these
subsequently enacted arrest standards are merely statutory, constitutional
remedies are inappropriate when those statutes have been violated by police.
Although the Legislature could certainly specify suppression as the remedy for
police violation of one of these statutes, because such a statutory violation is not a
constitutional violation, suppression is not warranted absent such a legislative
directive.
158 Idaho at 889. Thus, this Court unequivocally stated the legislature cannot work around the
Idaho Constitution by amending the statutes incorporated at the Constitution’s adoption. If the
legislature wants to change the constitutional standards for a warrantless arrest, it must amend
the Idaho Constitution.
Moreover, requiring a constitutional amendment to change the Idaho Constitution does
not mean the legislature cannot change the statutory standards for a warrantless arrest. The
legislature certainly has the power to amend statutes and did so with I.C. § 19-603. I.C. § 19-603
therefore  is  not  “some  sort  of  super-statute”  “immune  to  legislative  amendment.”  (Resp.  Br.,
p.16.) The legislature can freely amend I.C. § 19-603 to grant law enforcement various statutory
authority to conduct warrantless arrests. The legislature could even create a statutory remedy of
suppression for the statutory violations. Yet, the legislature’s amendments to I.C. § 19-603
cannot diminish the long-standing constitutional protections of Idaho citizens. See State v.
Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 869 (1997) (Article XXI, Section 2 affirms substantive rights existing
prior to the Constitution’s adoption). This division of statutory and constitutional protections is
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entirely consistent with Green’s application of the exclusionary rule. If a police officer arrests an
individual in violation of the statute only, the subsequently discovered evidence is not subject to
suppression. 158 Idaho at 889–892. But, if the police officer arrests an individual in violation of
the Idaho Constitution, the exclusionary rule applies. Id. at 892. The legislature cannot
circumvent the constitutional protections of Idaho citizens and avoid the exclusionary rule by
adding more and more statutory authorizations for law enforcement to conduct warrantless
arrests.
Ultimately, there is “clear precedent” and “circumstances unique” to Idaho and its
Constitution for “the Idaho Constitution’s interpretation to deviate from the interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution.” Id. R.S. § 7540 has been in effect before, during, and after the adoption of the
Idaho Constitution. See Revised  Statutes  of  the  Territory  of  Idaho,  Pt.  4  (Penal),  Pt.  2  (Of
Criminal Procedure), Title III, Ch. V, § 7540 (1887); I.C. § 19-603. These statutory protections
were incorporated by Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution when the Constitution was
adopted. See Green, 158 Idaho at 887–92. Idaho’s appellate courts have consistently recognized
these statutory-turned-constitutional protections.3 (See App. Br., pp.12–14.) Therefore, the
warrantless arrest of Mr. Clark for a misdemeanor committed hours earlier and outside the police
officer’s presence violated Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court
should have suppressed the evidence from Mr. Clarke’s warrantless arrest. (See App. Br., pp.15–
16.)
Turning to the U.S. Constitution, Mr. Clarke respectfully refers this Court to his
Appellant’s Brief, except to emphasize the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether
3 To this end, Mr. Clarke submits the Washington Supreme Court’s decision on its state
constitution has little to no persuasive value on this Court’s interpretation of its Constitution.
(See Resp. Br., pp.11–12.)
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warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors are constitutionally reasonable. Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008)—which has no bearing on the protections given to Idaho citizens by
the Idaho Constitution—identified an in-the-presence requirement for warrantless arrests more
than once. (See Resp. Br., p.8.) First, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “In a long line of cases, we
have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor
crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is
constitutionally reasonable.” Moore, 553 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added). Second, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that it “declined to limit” “the Fourth Amendment rule allowing arrest
based on probable cause to believe a law has been broken in the presence of the arresting
officer” to felonies and disturbing the peace only. Id. at 175 (emphasis added). Third, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated, “We conclude that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the
presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that while States are
free  to  regulate  such  arrests  however  they  desire,  state  restrictions  do  not  alter  the  Fourth
Amendment’s protections.” Id. at 176 (emphasis added). Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court stated,
“When officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their
presence,  the  Fourth  Amendment  permits  them to  make  an  arrest,  and  to  search  the  suspect  in
order to safeguard evidence and ensure their own safety.” Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
Regardless of the decisions of other federal circuit courts or state courts, the U.S. Supreme Court
has expressly declined to rule on whether the Fourth Amendment has an “in the presence”
requirement for warrantless misdemeanor arrests. See  Atwater  v.  City  of  Lago  Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 341 n.11 (2001). (App. Br., p.17 & n.10.) As argued in his Appellant’s Brief, U.S. Supreme
Court dicta, Framing-era history, and traditional standards of reasonableness support this Fourth
Amendment protection. (App. Br., pp.16–25.)
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For the reasons stated herein and in Mr. Clarke’s Appellant’s Brief, he submits the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He respectfully requests this Court reverse
the district court’s order denying his suppression motion.
II.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct And Thereby Violated Mr. Clarke’s Right To A Fair
Trial By Misstating The Evidence In Her Closing Argument
Mr. Clarke also challenged the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of evidence in closing
argument. (App. Br., pp.25–32.) The prosecutor misrepresented the evidence on the sole
contested element in the case:  Mr. Clarke’s knowledge of a trace amount of methamphetamine
inside a syringe in his shoe. Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury that, at the jail, Officer
Hanson told Mr. Clarke that he “can’t bring drug in here,” at which point Mr. Clarke admitted to
possessing drugs. (Tr., p.183, Ls.10–18.) The prosecutor also told the jury that Officer Hanson
asked Mr. Clarke about “controlled substances,” “drugs specifically,” and “[t]hat is when
Mr. Clarke decided to say there’s something in there, I remember now, there’s a syringe in my
shoe.” (Tr., p.189, L.14–p.190, L.18.) These statements by the prosecutor are misrepresentations
of  the  evidence  because  Officer  Hanson  did  not  ask  Mr.  Clarke  about  drugs  or  controlled
substances; he asked Mr. Clarke about “anything illegal.” (Tr., p.138, Ls.7–15, p.138, L.23–
p.139, L.3.)
The State contends the prosecutor did not misrepresent the evidence, but rather made
“reasonable inferences” from the evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.24, 26.) Mr. Clarke disagrees with the
State’s characterization of the prosecutor’s statements. The prosecutor certainly is permitted to
make inferences from the evidence, but the prosecutor cannot misrepresent the evidence to make
those inferences. If the prosecutor had accurately recited Officer Hanson’s testimony, and then
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told the jury to infer Mr. Clarke’s knowledge from that testimony, there would be no error in this
case. But that is not what the prosecutor did. The prosecutor misstated the evidence in the first
place, and then told the jury to make inferences from her false representations. It is improper for
the prosecutor to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence. State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477,
399 P.3d 804, 829 (2017).
As for the first, unobjected-to misstatement (“can’t bring drugs in here”), the State argues
this error is not clear from the record. (Resp. Br., pp.24–25.) The State references its argument
from above—that the error is unclear because the prosecutor was providing a reasonable
interpretation of the evidence. (Resp. Br., pp.24–25.) This is not the test for whether an error is
obvious or plain from the record. The test is whether the error “plainly exists (without the need
for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision).” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
Mr. Clarke has met this burden. The error plainly exists because it is clear from the face of the
record and no additional information is needed. It cannot be said that defense counsel’s failure to
object was a tactical decision when defense counsel objected to a similar misrepresentation later
on in closing arguments. Mere “speculation” that defense counsel’s failure to object was tactical
or strategic is insufficient to defeat this prong of the Perry test. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho
161, 166–67 (Ct. App. 2011). Defense counsel gained no advantage by failing to object to the
prosecutor’s misstatement on the key, contested element at trial.
For both misstatements, the State relies on the stock jury instructions to prove these
errors were harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.25, 26–27.) The district court instructed the jury that closing
arguments are not evidence. (See R., pp.132, 144, 156.) These pattern instructions, however, are
given in all cases. These instructions should not be relied on as a cure-all for prosecutorial
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misconduct. Otherwise, these pattern instructions are a blanket invitation for prosecutors “to
exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error” without
fear of being held accountable for misconduct. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 144 (2014)
(quoting State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007)). Moreover, these instructions do not
remedy the specific error in this case. These instructions are intended to inform the jury (1)
argument itself is not evidence and (2) to make its own inferences from the evidence. The error
here is that the prosecutor misstated the evidence itself. These instructions do not necessarily
cover this type of misconduct. And, although the jury is instructed to “follow your memory” “[i]f
the facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them,” (R., p.144),
this does not cure the error if a juror did not remember or was unsure of Officer Hanson’s
testimony and, as such, relied on the prosecutor’s misrepresentation. Further, even if a juror
accurately remembered Officer Hanson’s testimony, that juror could easily question his memory
and set aside his belief when informed otherwise by the prosecutor:
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and
that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more
credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in
the presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused.
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). These stock jury instructions do not show the
error was harmless.
Also for both misstatements, the State argues the errors were harmless because only one
syringe had the trace amount of methamphetamine (the one in Mr. Clarke’s shoe) and
Mr. Clarke’s defense was not “based upon a distinction between ‘anything illegal’ and ‘drugs.’”
(Resp. Br., pp.25, 26–27.) To the contrary, Mr. Clarke’s defense was based upon this distinction.
His counsel argued in closing:
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I think if you go back there and look at the pictures that the State has presented to
you, the pictures showing what that needle actually looked like on August 1, if
you look at that picture, it looks like an old used empty needle, and if Mr. Clarke
looked at that needle and thought, there’s nothing in there, it’s an old empty
needle, well, then he’s guilty of the paraphernalia, but he’s not guilty of
knowingly possessing methamphetamine.
(Tr., p.186, Ls.9–17 (emphasis added).) Later on, counsel argued:  “This wasn’t a baggie of
methamphetamine. This was a piece of paraphernalia. Now, I think you all know, okay,
paraphernalia is used to ingest drugs, but after that’s done, don’t you think that it just goes back
to being paraphernalia again?” (Tr., p.186, Ls.21–25 (emphasis added).) Hence, Mr. Clarke’s
defense was that he knew about something “illegal” in his shoe—drug paraphernalia in the form
of the syringe. But he disputed his knowledge of the trace amount of methamphetamine inside.
The prosecutor’s misrepresentation that there was direct evidence on Mr. Clarke’s knowledge of
“controlled substances” and “drugs specifically” in the syringe was not harmless.
Lastly,  Mr.  Clarke  seeks  to  clarify  the  State’s  argument  as  to  a  third  statement  by  the
prosecutor:   “That  is  when  Mr.  Clarke  decided  to  say  there’s  something  in  there,  I  remember
now, there’s a syringe in my shoe.” (See Resp. Br., pp.27–29.) Mr. Clarke does not assert
fundamental error for prosecutorial misconduct in stating Mr. Clarke admitted to a syringe in his
shoe.4 But, Mr. Clarke maintains the second, objected-to misstatement (“asks about controlled
substances, asks him about drugs specifically”) is error. The prosecutor misrepresented to the
jury that Officer Hanson asked Mr. Clarke about controlled substance and drugs and this specific
question prompted Mr. Clarke to respond and admit his possession. The error is not Mr. Clarke’s
response to Officer Hanson’s question, but the prosecutor’s misrepresentation of the question
itself.
4 This clarification does not waive Mr. Clarke’s argument as to the errors addressed on appeal.
14
In sum, the prosecutor violated Mr. Clarke’s constitutional rights to due process and a fair
trial by misrepresenting the evidence on the only contested element in order to tip the scales in
favor of the State. For the first, unobjected-to misstatement (“can’t bring drugs in here”),
Mr. Clarke has met his burden to show fundamental error. (See App. Br., pp.26–32.) For the
second, preserved misstatement (“asks about controlled substances, asks him about drugs
specifically”), Mr. Clarke has shown prosecutorial misconduct, and the State had not met its
burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error was harmless. (See App. Br., pp.26–30,
31–32.)
CONCLUSION
On the  motion  to  suppress  issue,  Mr.  Clarke  respectfully  requests  this  Court  reverse  or
vacate the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, vacate the judgment of
conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, on the prosecutorial
misconduct issue, Mr. Clarke respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction
and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 12th day of April, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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